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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

9 October 1951

STAYBEHIND OPERATIONS IN GERMANY

This report is intended as a survey of the non-ZIPPER staybehind picture in Germany at the beginning of October 1951. It is based entirely on the information contained in Washington files.

DAD staybehind planning was given its original impetus by the Berlin crisis in 1948. At that time almost nothing was known of the practical difficulties involved in the setting up of staybehind nets, and the greatest progress to date has been made in the realm of experience, largely through the application of trial and error methods. Since the beginning of the Korean War, considerably more effort has been put into staybehind operations in the field, particularly at KOB, where [redacted] assisted by several junior case officers, has been spending his full time on staybehind projects. Some tangible results are now apparent. Washington guidance, however, has been conspicuously lacking. Responsibility at Headquarters for staybehind operations has passed from one hand to another, with no one taking any strong and consistent action over a period of time.

Planning in the field has envisioned the following arrangement which would be put into effect on the outbreak of hostilities: Radio contact would be established by the staybehind agents with a base somewhere behind the Allied lines, probably ultimately in England. Staybehind agents would be organized into teams, the members of which would in some instances already know one another, and in other instances be put in touch with one another at the time of activation. Each team would have at least one commo man and preferably several agents to collect intelligence and carry out intelligence directives.

The field has been faced with the twofold responsibility of recruiting and training agent personnel, and providing equipment to be used by the agents once they are activated: commo equipment, gold, weapons, and possibly also food and medical supplies. Finding a suitable method for caching such perishable articles as radios and weapons so that they will be in a usable condition when needed has turned out to be a major problem which will probably require technical advice and extensive experimentation in the U.S. before it is solved. The major difficulties are discussed below in connection with the VULTURE Project.

Staybehind operations have been carried on by the Karlsruhe and Berlin Operations Bases. The status of the current projects at these two bases is outlined below.

DOCUMENT NO. _____
NO. COPIES IN CLASS _____
 UNCLASSIFIED
CLASSIFICATION NO. IS 3800
DATE REVIEW DATE: 2011
27 MAY 1981

KARLSRUHE OPERATIONS BASE

how established?
Personnel: KIBITZ is the KOB project for recruiting, organizing, and training staybehind personnel. The goal of KIBITZ has been to develop personnel in strategic locations throughout western Germany. This effort, however, has been limited by (a) the standards of capability combined with stayability required in staybehind agents, and (b) the lack of case officers who are able to travel the distances involved. The latter factor is responsible for the concentration of KIBITZ personnel in the Karlsruhe area.

At present there are about twenty-two KIBITZ's in varying stages of development under the direct control of KOB. In addition, KIBITZ 15, who is setting up a staybehind net of his own under our supervision and direction, has over 470 individuals either spotted, under development, or already prepared. KIBITZ 15 is a former German Army colonel who offered his services to McCloy and was passed on to us. He has shown remarkable ability as a staybehind organizer, and his activities have been a useful supplement to our own.

There are now three staybehind teams, one of them under KIBITZ 15, which are fully trained and ready for the assignment of equipment and signal plans. The present plan is not to assign these items until the time of activation. Two of these prepared teams, under KIBITZ's 6 and 10, consist of only two men each. Both teams successfully conducted field problems as the final phase of their training; but the field problems indicated that two men per team is not really enough, and KIBITZ's 6 and 10 have been directed to fill out their teams.

Eight other KIBITZ's have been partially trained in communications; several of them require very little further training. Difficulty has been experienced in most cases in fitting these individuals, who are kept busy by their overt jobs, into a training schedule.

Commo training has been conducted by the Communications Section at a field installation, MISSOURI. This training includes all phases of radio operating and techniques to qualify an individual to operate agent radio equipment. It is given by American personnel in an American controlled installation.

X The intelligence agents in the KIBITZ program have not gone through a training course. No plan for their training has as yet been suggested. Some of them are qualified from previous military experience to report on OB.

A new problem concerning staybehind agents has recently been brought up by KOB. It is felt that when German participation in the defense of western Europe becomes a reality, many questions will be

raised by these agents regarding tie-ins with western defense and transferral to a German sponsored staybehind organization. Our approach to most of the agents thus far has been that the program has arisen out of German initiative but is being sponsored by the Americans. KOB believes that this problem will become more concrete as German defense participation develops, and suggests as a solution the integration of staybehind agents into whatever German military organization comes into being.

Equipment: The burial of staybehind equipment by KOB is known as the VULTURE Project. Thirteen burials, most of them including gold and weapons in addition to radio equipment, have so far been accomplished in this project. All of these burials have been in western Germany and have been carried out by American personnel, except for VULTURE A, which was carried piecemeal by CADGER to Leipzig in 1949, and cached there at the home of a friend. It is no longer believed to be usable.

Since the first part of 1951, the VULTURE Project has hung in a state of uncertainty. During January and February VULTURES B, C, and D, having been in the ground since 1949, were exhumed in order to determine the state of preservation of burials which have been in the ground for two years. Each of these burials was found to have reached such an advanced stage of deterioration that the equipment was completely useless. In addition, the problems which would be encountered by agent personnel in recovering such burials were illustrated by the fact that only the presence of American personnel on the scene made it possible for two of the three sets to be recovered, even in the dead of night.

It appears that the remaining nine burials are now also useless, or will soon become so, if they are not all dug up and replaced. If the system of burials is to be continued on any practical basis, a means of protection for the equipment will have to be devised. Both a non-corrosive outer covering (the zinc alloy previously used has proved unsatisfactory) and a method for removing moisture from the inside of the container must be found. The field has made several suggestions, but is not in a position to obtain the best solution.

In all probability the practice of burials will have to be supplemented by some other means of storing equipment. The field has suggested that radio equipment might well be assigned to responsible agents now, provided they are able to find safe hiding places in their homes or elsewhere.

BERLIN OPERATIONS BASE

Personnel: BOB has so far produced the following staybehind agents or agent candidates: CALAMUS 2A, a seasoned agent whose commo training should now be complete; CATTY 4, a 22 year old girl, now in the advanced stage of commo training; and CATARACT 2, a female intelligence agent who has also been receiving commo training, but for whose staybehind activity no definite plans have as yet been formulated. In addition, Washington approval has been given for the CAJUN Project, initiated at the beginning of 1951 for the purpose of building up a pool of trained commo personnel in the Berlin area. No concrete results have as yet appeared from this project.

Equipment: Six burials were accomplished by American personnel of BOB between December 1950 and April 1951. These burials included radio equipment, weapons, and gold coins. Although the caches were packaged in waterproof cloth and lead casings, interior moisture will probably cause deterioration of the equipment within two years.

Three other radios were cached in Leipzig, Dresden, and Rostock during 1948 and 1949 by agents of the CALAMUS chain, and one radio was buried in October 1950 on the island of Ruegen by CAISSON 20.

Note: Both personnel and equipment operations conducted by BOB were originally grouped under the WRINKLE Project. BOB burials, however, are now being given VULTURE BOB designations, and the only going personnel projects under BOB are CALAMUS 2A, CATTY 4, CATARACT 2, and CAJUN. It would seem, therefore, that the WRINKLE Project has now become obsolete. For purposes of clarification, it would probably be best to consolidate all BOB staybehind personnel operations into one project, patterned after KIBITZ, under a new cryptonym, while including all equipment caches throughout Germany under either VULTURE KOB or VULTURE BOB as appropriate.

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In addition to staybehind personnel and equipment, such operational support items as safe houses, contact points, letter drops, and drop zones for air drops will have to be provided for at some time before the beginning of hostilities. KOB has a possible drop zone on the property of KIBITZ 12. BOB recently submitted to Washington descriptions of possible dead letter drops, as well as possible agent contact points, compiled by CATARACT 1. In January 1951 an attempt was made by Washington to institute a consolidated safe house program, to be known as FOLD (KOB or BOB), but the results so far have been few. BOB has mentioned five possible safe houses in the East Zone, all connected with

the CALAMUS chain.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Aside from the general need for giving encouragement and constructive guidance to the field, specific Headquarters action is called for on the following points, given in the approximate order of their urgency:

1. Determination of the best method or methods of providing equipment for future use by the staybehind agents. The question of whether burials can be made more permanent must be decided soon, so that the burial program, if found to be practical, and some supplementary program, if thought to be necessary, can receive further action.
2. The recruiting and training of staybehind agents in Berlin should be stepped up and consolidated into a unified program. Thus far, BOB has been training commo personnel only, and on an individual basis, with little thought being given to their ultimate roles in the total staybehind setup.
3. A program for establishing drop zones, safe houses, letter drops, etc. should be encouraged and given direction.
4. Such administrative details as the standardization of cache report procedure and the obtaining of operational clearances on a number of the agents should be cleared up.
5. Some thought should be given, possibly by the higher echelons, to the question of integrating our staybehind program into the overall western defense program.

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