

# Government of the Shadows

Parapolitics and Criminal Sovereignty

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## Beyond Democratic Checks and Balances: The 'Propaganda Due' Masonic Lodge and the CIA in Italy's First Republic

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During the Cold War (1947–91), the European continent was divided into two blocs: a bloc of communist countries in Eastern Europe and a bloc of capitalist countries in Western Europe. From the very beginning of the Cold War, the capitalist countries in Western Europe cultivated a transatlantic friendship with the United States of America and together created the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1949. NATO, which remains the world's largest military alliance, guaranteed mutual military assistance, as the member countries agreed that a military attack on any single NATO country would be regarded as an attack on all of them.

On the other side of the 'Iron Curtain' which divided the European continent, the communist countries of Eastern Europe fell into the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union. Countering the perceived threat from the NATO alliance, the Russians, together with the countries of Eastern Europe, in 1955 formed the so-called 'Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance', often referred to as the 'Warsaw Pact'. Like the NATO alliance, the Warsaw alliance was a military organisation in which the members pledged to defend each other if one or more of them were attacked. With the end of the Cold War following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact was dissolved in June 1991 and many of its former member states in Eastern Europe have since joined NATO.

Historical analysis of the recent history of the European continent has correctly pointed out that during the Cold War the countries in Eastern Europe were not governed according to the principles of democratic transparency, the rule of law and political accountability. The Soviet Union, having suffered a very high death toll during the German attacks on Russia in both the First and Second World Wars, made it clear that the Warsaw Pact served as a security belt for the USSR and political independence for Warsaw Pact countries was therefore not an option. The human security of citizens in the Warsaw Pact countries was thus violated repeatedly and consistently, most famously during the anti-Soviet revolt in Hungary in 1956, which was suppressed by Soviet troops and led to thousands of deaths, and during

the ‘Prague Spring’ of 1968, when the struggle for greater political freedoms by Czechoslovakia was ended by a Warsaw Pact invasion labelled ‘fraternal assistance against the counter-revolution’.

While historical analysis of the recent history of Eastern Europe has been successful in pointing out the numerous democratic deficits of the Warsaw Pact countries, the same rigour has not yet been applied to the history of Western Europe. On a very superficial level of analysis, the myth has been cherished that all countries of Eastern Europe were dark and brutal dictatorships, while all countries of Western Europe were shining examples of transparent democracies, where power was at all times controlled by the rule of law and an intelligent system of checks and balances which prevented abuse and crime.

A closer look at the historical data, of course, quickly reveals this to be a myth. Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey during the Cold War all suffered from either military dictatorship or military coups d’état which destroyed the democratic rule of law in these countries and led to torture and abuse of power in NATO-controlled Western Europe. Furthermore, new historical research by the author has revealed in 2005 that secret military structures existed, under the designation ‘stay-behind armies’ in most countries of Western Europe, including Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Luxembourg, Norway and Denmark. These secret armies operated beyond checks and balances and for many years remained unknown to parliamentarians and the public at large.<sup>1</sup> A detailed examination of the historical data also shows that checks and balances and constitutionalism did not, in fact, rule supreme at all times in the democracies of the West.

All of this sheds a completely new light on our understanding of the recent history of the European continent. But it goes further still, for in addition to military dictatorships, secret armies and clandestine operations by intelligence services, the rule of law and political accountability in Western Europe suffered a further heavy blow from so-called ‘secret societies’, the most well-known example of which in Europe today is the Masonic Lodge ‘Propaganda Due’ (P2), discovered in Italy in 1981. P2 was literally a state within the state and operated beyond any democratic controls.

Large differences exist among Western European countries – for example, Turkey and Denmark – and hence the data must be studied independently for each country specifically. Accordingly, in this chapter I will deal with one country only, and show how Italy has been affected by such secret structures and clandestine operations by looking at the relationships between the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the P2 and NATO’s stay-behind army.

#### THE CIA AND THE ELECTIONS OF 1948

The US foreign secret service, the Central Intelligence Agency, was founded in 1947. The first covert action operation ever carried out by the CIA targeted not a country in Latin America or Southeast Asia, but a European country: Italy – specifically, the then strong Italian Communist Party.

US President Harry Truman, together with all other members of the US National Security Council (NSC) in Washington, feared that in Italy's first postwar election scheduled for spring 1948 the Communists might win an overwhelming victory. The Italian Communists' popularity rested on their prominent role in the resistance against the Italian fascists and the German Nazis during the First World War.

The NSC, consisting of the US President, Vice President, Defense Minister, Foreign Minister and the Director of the CIA as well as a number of other high-ranking members of the US administration, was founded together with the CIA in 1947. Meeting in the White House, the NSC has been responsible for directing secret operations for six decades and during this period it has repeatedly operated at, or across, the borderline of legality. This led US historian Kathryn Olmsted of the University of California to remark that the NSC and the intelligence services it controls represented a form of 'secret government'. The NSC was investigated following the Watergate scandal, but according to Olmsted, these investigations were terminated without much success. 'After starting the investigations,' Olmsted asked in 1996, 'why did most members of the press and Congress back away from challenging the secret government?'<sup>2</sup>

With the introduction of the Internet in the 1990s, a larger audience has become interested in covert action operations and the business of both the NSC and the CIA. 'Who decides when CIA [sic] should participate in covert actions, and why?' one of the frequently asked questions (FAQ) on the official CIA homepage inquires. 'Only the President can direct the CIA to undertake a covert action', the CIA answers.

Such actions usually are recommended by the National Security Council (NSC). Covert actions are considered when the NSC judges that US foreign policy objectives may not be fully realized by normal diplomatic means and when military action is deemed to be too extreme an option. Therefore, the Agency may be directed to conduct a special activity abroad in support of foreign policy where the role of the US Government is neither apparent nor publicly acknowledged.<sup>3</sup>

The first of these NSC operations targeted Italy. The NSC issued a document, NSC 1/1 of 14 November 1947, which read: 'The Italian Government, ideologically inclined toward Western democracy, is weak and is being subjected to continuous attack by a strong Communist Party.'<sup>4</sup> Thereafter the NSC, on 19 December 1947, adopted the top secret directive NSC 4-A, which ordered CIA Director Roscoe Hillenkoetter to undertake a broad range of covert activities to prevent a communist victory in the first national postwar Italian election scheduled for 16 April 1948. Within the CIA, Director Hillenkoetter gave the task of manipulating the Italian election to the CIA's covert action department, 'Office of Policy Coordination' (OPC), headed by Frank Wisner.

Targeting liberated Europe with secret covert action operations was a highly sensitive strategy, as the NSC members knew. If uncovered, European trust in the US could be severely damaged. The highest standards of secrecy were therefore applied. There were only three copies of NSC 4-A, one of which Hillenkoetter had 'closely guarded in the Director's office, where members of his own staff who did

not “need to know” could gain no access to it’. A second copy was with George F. Kennan at the State Department.<sup>5</sup>

In order to guarantee plausible denial, the majority of the transcripts of NSC meetings, as well as the majority of NSC assessments, decisions and orders to the CIA, remain inaccessible to researchers until today. Also, US special parliamentary investigations only rarely publish top secret NSC documents. However, exceptions do exist. In the aftermath of the Watergate scandal, the select US Senate committee under Senator Frank Church critically investigated the CIA and the NSC and discovered during the investigation that the CIA had carried out covert action operations in Europe.

The national elections in Europe in 1948 [in Italy] had been a primary motivation in the establishment of OPC. By channelling funds to center parties and developing media assets, OPC attempted to influence the election results – with considerable success. These activities formed the basis for covert political action for the next twenty years.<sup>6</sup>

Most Italians were unaware that the CIA manipulated their elections in 1948. The Italian Communist Party (PCI) – the largest in Western Europe – and the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) had united for the elections, forming the Popular Democratic Front (FDP). They competed with the Christian Democratic Party (DCI), which had been newly created after the Second World War with US assistance. In municipal elections preceding the national vote the FDP had shown its muscle, assigning only second rank to the DCI.

Most observers expected the FDP to gain the majority in the Italian parliament. But CIA covert action successfully manipulated the outcome so that of a total of 574 seats in the Italian parliament the majority, at least 287 seats, would go to the CIA-supported DCI. The strategy was simple: the DCI would be strengthened by the pumping of \$10 million into its campaign,<sup>7</sup> while the communist–socialist coalition would be weakened through a smear campaign. The CIA issued ‘anonymous pamphlets which defamed PCI candidates’ sex and personal lives’ and ‘smear[ed] them with the Fascist and/or anti-Church brush’.<sup>8</sup> This tactic of targeting specific seats to give control to the DCI rather than going for a complete sweep ‘was successful in all but two of the two hundred plus seats selected’.<sup>9</sup> In the final election the DCI won 307 seats – 48 per cent of the vote – with the leftist coalition unexpectedly polling only 31 per cent and thus not even winning 200 seats.

President Truman was so impressed by the CIA’s Italian operation that he saw to it that covert action was institutionalised as an instrument of US statecraft. Only two months after the Italian election, on 18 June 1948, the National Security Council passed directive NSC 10/2 to replace NSC 4-A. While NSC 4-A had authorised the CIA to carry out covert action operations in Italy only, NSC 10/2 gave the CIA the task to carry out covert actions across the world. The documents stated:

‘covert operations’ are understood to be all activities...which are conducted or sponsored by this government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and

conducted that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them. Specifically, such operations shall include any covert activities related to: propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition, and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.<sup>10</sup>

By creating the CIA and passing NSC 10/2 Truman had unleashed US covert action, secret warfare and dirty tricks on a grand scale. ‘During his twenty-year retirement Truman sometimes seemed amazed, even somewhat appalled, at the size and power of the intelligence community he had brought into being’, British historian Christopher Andrew commented.<sup>11</sup> Retired and fragile, Truman himself claimed, ‘I never had any thought when I set up the CIA that it would be injected into peacetime cloak and dagger operations.’<sup>12</sup> In 1964, eight years before his death, Truman had moral doubts about what he had done and declared that he had never intended the CIA ‘to operate as an international agency engaged in strange activities’.<sup>13</sup>

#### PROPAGANDA DUE (P2)

Until as recently as a quarter of a century ago the official political history of Italy’s First Republic (1945–93) did not mention the influence of the international society of the Freemasons on the country. Italy, to many, was a normal democracy in Western Europe, governed by the rule of law and a system of transparent checks and balances.

This noble image changed abruptly in April 1981, when Milan magistrates investigating the crimes of US Italian Mafia banker Michele Sindona broke into the villa of a certain Licio Gelli near Arezzo in Italy’s Tuscany region. Gelli, until then, had been almost completely unknown to a larger public in Italy, let alone on the stage of world history. The people in his village Arezzo knew him as a friendly businessman and the owner of a company named Permaflex which produced mattresses.

In Gelli’s villa, the Italian police came across documents which were to forever change the political history of Italy’s First Republic. Due to the extraordinary nature of these documents, historians are still struggling today to integrate them into a larger international interpretation of the Cold War. The documents confirmed the reality of an entire Italian parallel state named ‘P2’ and headed by Licio Gelli, revealing that 962 Italians belonged to Gelli’s secret P2 Lodge at the time of its discovery. The member list – and this was of particular political relevance – included some of the most powerful members of Italian society and read like a ‘Who’s Who’ of Italy.

While the French *philosophe* Montesquieu (1689–1755) had insisted that for a state to be democratic it must feature a clear division of power between the legislative, the executive and the judicature, P2 literally destroyed this principle of checks and balances. Its members came from all three branches of the state,

a mechanism which subverted the original democratic idea according to which the three branches of the state are designed to control and balance each other. P2 members, instead of controlling each other, cooperated in secrecy and operated beyond all accountability. Fifty-two were high-ranking officers of the Carabinieri paramilitary police; 50 were high-ranking officers of the Italian army; 37 were high-ranking officers of the Finance Police; 29 were high-ranking officers of the Italian navy; 11 were Presidents of the police; 70 were influential and wealthy industrialists; 10 were presidents of banks; 3 were acting ministers; 2 were former ministers; 1 was the president of a political party; 38 were members of parliament; and 14 were high-ranking judges. Others were mayors, directors of hospitals, lawyers, notaries and journalists.

Next to Licio Gelli, the most prominent person on the P2 list was Silvio Berlusconi. The exposure of Berlusconi as a P2 member did not end his career. On the contrary, he later entered politics and rose to become Prime Minister of Italy, while his business operations enabled him to become Italy's richest man; according to *Forbes* magazine 2005, his €12 billion placed him among the 50 richest persons in the world.

When P2 was discovered, the spotlight was not on Berlusconi but on Licio Gelli, a veteran of the Italian political right who had spent most of his life fighting communism across the world. Born in 1919 and only semi-educated, having been expelled from school at the age of 13 for striking the headmaster, Gelli aged 17 had travelled to Spain and had enrolled as a volunteer in the Black Shirts of Franco to fight on the side of the fascists in the Spanish civil war. During the Second World War, Gelli was a sergeant major and supported the fascist German SS division of Hermann Goering. The Italian communists, who fought both Hitler and Mussolini during the Second World War, hated Gelli. When they captured him at the end of the war his death came close, but Gelli managed to flee to the US army in Italy, which protected him from the Italian left and helped him to reach a position of great influence as a leading anti-communist in postwar Italy.

As a sign of trust and respect, Gelli was regularly invited to the White House in Washington. Gelli's most influential decade was the 1970s. In 1974, he was a guest at Gerald Ford's presidential inauguration ceremony and in 1977 he was present again at Jimmy Carter's. And when Ronald Reagan was inaugurated in 1981, Gelli sat in the first row. P2 member Colonel Antonio Viezzer later confirmed that in the 1970s Gelli was 'the most powerful man in Italy beyond whom nobody else stood'.<sup>14</sup> P2 member Federico Umberto D'Amato, head of the Italian political police from 1972 to 1974, also had vivid memories of Gelli's political power and related one of his meetings with Gelli:

While he [Gelli] was standing in front of me a politician called who right then was about to become Prime Minister. He [the politician] said to him [Gelli]: 'Licio, see, if you say that I should not accept then I will not accept [the position of Prime Minister]'.<sup>15</sup>

An enigmatic symbol of extra-constitutional power, Gelli never had any qualms about illegal operations outside the framework of democratic checks and balances



because he was convinced that he was doing the right thing, namely, saving Italy from communism. 'I deserve a medal', he once remarked.<sup>16</sup>

In order to escape the Italian police following the discovery of the P2 in 1981, Gelli fled to South America. A year later he was seen in Switzerland, seeking to withdraw \$120 million from an anonymous Swiss number account in a UBS bank in Geneva. The Swiss police arrested him on 13 September 1982 and locked him up in the Champs Dollon prison. For almost a year, Gelli was Switzerland's most prominent prisoner. However, on 10 August 1983, he escaped under mysterious circumstances and made his way to France, whereupon both the Swiss and French authorities, like their Italian colleagues, issued an international search warrant. In 1989 the Swiss were able to arrest Gelli again. They handed him over to Italy, where he was charged and sentenced but released seven months later 'for reasons of ill health'.

Legal battles aiming to imprison 'Cold Warrior' Gelli continued, however, into the 1990s. He was charged with conspiracy against the state and subversion and sentenced by Italian magistrates for having been involved in the Bologna terror attack of 2 August 1980, which had killed 85 and injured or maimed 200. When the Bologna verdict had to be dropped due to lack of proof, Gelli was accused in the context of another sinister affair: the Banco Ambrosiano scandal. The bank had allegedly recycled illegal mafia money and sponsored Italian right-wing terrorists in their battle against the Italian communists. The judges concluded in 1992 that just before the bank had gone bankrupt in the early 1980s, Gelli had moved part of the Ambrosiano millions to a Swiss bank account, an offence for which he was sentenced to 18 years and 6 months imprisonment. Gelli appealed the verdict, but the highest Italian court in Milan confirmed on 22 April 1998 that Gelli was guilty, whereupon the 79-year-old man fled to France. In Cannes, in the south of France, Gelli was arrested on 10 September 1998. When the French police seized him he broke his glasses and unsuccessfully tried to commit suicide by cutting an artery.<sup>17</sup>

Interpretation and contextualisation of the phenomenon of the P2 parallel state and its leader, Licio Gelli, is very difficult for historians and academics who work in the fields of law and political science. Most have chosen either to ignore the topic, or to touch on it only briefly. British historian Paul Ginsborg, who arguably wrote the standard English-language work on the political history of postwar Italy (*A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics 1943–1988*), uses 400 pages to introduce his subject to the interested reader, yet offers only three sentences on the P2. He notes that in 1981

the existence of a subversive Masonic lodge, the P2, was discovered. Its members included prominent figures in the armed forces, in business and in the world of politics. The precise objectives of the lodge have remained obscure, but there is little doubt that its head, Licio Gelli, was seeking to construct an anti-communist network within the highest echelons of the Italian state.<sup>18</sup>

Ginsborg was right. Gelli had never made any secrets about the fact that he hated the communists, and that everybody else in the P2 was also strictly anti-

communist. 'I can tell you that we [in the P2 lodge] were always anti-communist', he told journalists.<sup>19</sup> Aware of the fact that in Italy the fight between the political right and the political left had led to numerous deaths in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, pushing the country to the brink of civil war, the journalists wanted to know whether Gelli had also been involved in operations which killed other Italians on the political left. 'How far would you have gone in your campaign against communism?' Gelli was asked, to which he replied evasively: 'Ah, number one enemy was communism [silence] – We were an association of believers – We did not admit non believers – We wanted to stop communism in its track, eliminate communism, fight communism.'<sup>20</sup>

From a political perspective, this secret fight of the P2 against the Italian communists represented a constitutional problem because roughly one-third of the Italian population regularly voted for PCI, the communist party, which therefore was very strong in the Italian parliament.<sup>21</sup> When the Italian parliament discovered in 1981 that the secretive P2 had formed a parallel state, beyond checks and balances and with the aim to fight the PCI, it decided that such shadow governance represented a threat to the state, was illegal, and had to be closed down and investigated in detail. In 1981, a Parliamentary Commission was created with the task of investigating P2's shadow government. Headed by a courageous woman, Tina Anselmi, the P2 Commission shed some light on the international network of Freemasons and, above all, on the Italian P2 Masonic Lodge and secret politics in Italy. Three years later, after having heard hundreds of witnesses, including many Freemasons, and having looked through thousands of pages of documents, the Anselmi Commission presented its final report on the P2, on 3 July 1984.<sup>22</sup> The Commission left 115 volumes for future historical research in which the details of its investigations, the protocols of interrogations and debates and confiscated documents and expert judgements were contained.

Based on the documents available, the Anselmi Commission judged that the 962 P2 members mentioned on the lists found in Gelli's villa were only the tip of the iceberg. The total number of P2 members in Italy, according to the Commission's estimate, was 2,500. Yet, signalling its limited strength, the Anselmi Commission was unable to identify the remaining 1,500 members.

Among the Italian communists ranked with the best understanding of the parallel state and shadow politics was parliamentarian Sergio Flamigni. He represented the PCI in the Italian legislature for more than 20 years and was a member of both the Anselmi Commission investigating the P2, as well as of the commission which investigated the 1978 death of Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro. Few knew the secrets of the P2 anti-communist campaigns as well as Flamigni, who published a book on the P2 in which he explained that the 1981 discovery and the subsequent investigation and scandal 'gravely hurt' the P2 but did not end this form of secret government. 'The P2 Lodge remains active, in Italy and abroad', Flamigni concluded in his book in 1995.<sup>23</sup>

Freemasonry is a worldwide metaphysical brotherhood with ancient historical roots and organised according to rigid hierarchical structures. To the public at large in Italy and beyond it has remained, however, either unknown, mysterious or suspect. According to the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Freemasonry is 'the largest world-wide

secret society'. It evolved from the guilds of stonemasons and cathedral-builders of the Middle Ages, when some masons, unlike fellow artisans such as carpenters and blacksmiths who continued to be organised in guilds, left the guilds and as 'freemasons' travelled from town to town setting up their tents, which they called 'lodges', wherever they worked.

Freemasons exclude women and keep a very low profile, and the aims, structures and strategies of Freemasonry, incompatible with the democratic principle of transparency, are hardly ever the subject of international media or political science debates. In fact, Freemasonry is not a phenomenon studied at all at universities. In order to become a Freemason one must be male and above a minimum age of around 21 years, and have references from current Masons. Freemasons use an initiatory system of different degrees, similar to the ranks used in military service, where senior Freemasons support junior Freemasons to progressively explore political, economic and philosophical issues.

Unlike the Catholic Church, with its rigid hierarchical global structure headed by the Pope in Rome, Freemasons recognise no central global Masonic organisational structure, nor a specific Freemason who serves as the highest global authority. While the first centre of Freemasonry – the Grand Lodge of England, founded in 1717 – represents a centre of gravity, several Grand Lodges exist across the world, with each being a self-governing entity. No single authority exists above the Grand Lodges or over the whole of Freemasonry. Fearing both the influence of the secret society and its tolerance of different religions, Pope Clemente XII condemned Freemasonry in 1738, only five years after the first Italian Lodge had been set up in Florence.

Masonic practices vary greatly from country to country and within each country are determined by Lodge custom, the Lodge being the basic organisation of Freemasonry. Every new Lodge must be warranted by a Grand Lodge. A Master Freemason is generally entitled to visit a number of different Lodges in different countries, as long as these Lodges among each other have agreed on a certain set of principles. Lodge buildings have for many years been known as 'Temples', and, indeed, several different Lodges often use the same premises – each on published dates.

The P2 Masonic Lodge, the Anselmi Commission found, was a very particular and arguably very powerful Lodge, while other Lodges usually united men with much less political influence. Of the latter, more than 1,200 Lodges existed in the 1980s in Italy alone, with a total of 35,000 members. Masonic Lodges existed also in Germany, Spain, France, Australia, Switzerland, Argentina, Uruguay, Ireland, Greece, Indonesia and many other countries of the world. With an estimated 5 million members, the United States allegedly ranked as the country with the highest density of Lodges and Freemasons.<sup>24</sup>

Communist parliamentarians in the Anselmi Commission, including Antonio Bellocchio, considered the P2 Masonic Lodge as a threat to democracy, due to its explicit political plan to fight communism. 'We have come to the definite conclusion that Italy is a country of limited sovereignty because of the interference of the American secret service and international freemasonry', Bellocchio later recalled and remembered how he had wanted to enlarge the investigation and look beyond

the borders of Italy in order to research similar structures of shadow governance in the US. 'If the majority of the commission had been prepared to follow us in this analysis they would have had to admit that they are puppets of the United States of America, and they don't intend to admit that, ever.'<sup>25</sup>

While Italian communists insisted that the P2 had used dirty tricks and even criminal methods to fight the communists during the Cold War, other members of the Anselmi Commission were concerned with the reality of shadow governments and their implications.

If democracy is a system of rules and procedures which define the parameters within which political action can take place, what happens when alongside this system there is another one whose rules are mysterious, its procedures unknown, its power immense and which is able to protect itself against the formal institutions of democracy by a wall of secrecy?<sup>26</sup>

Clearly, from a democratic perspective, such powerful groups were, in theory at least, unacceptable. 'This is the dangerous side of extra-parliamentary activity', the Anselmi Commission concluded.<sup>27</sup>

Six years after the publication of the final report of the Anselmi Commission on the P2 an anonymous source labelled 'Zero One', later revealed to be former CIA agent Richard (Dick) Brennecke, claimed on Italian state television RAI 1 in summer 1990, 'I knew the P2 ever since 1969 and have dealt with it until the beginning of the 1980s. The government of the United States financed the P2 with up to \$10 million per month [sic].' This was an incredible statement, as it suggested that the US had supported an Italian shadow government with \$120 million per year, and implied that the White House had secretly controlled crucial parts of the Italian political process, making the idea of a sovereign Italian democracy look childish. Adding fuel to the fire, Brennecke claimed that the US, through the P2, had sponsored terrorism in Italy.

We have used the P2 to create tensions which led to the explosion of terrorism in Italy and other countries during the 1970s... The P2 is still active and is still being used for the same purpose as in the beginning of the 1970s. One of its most common names now is P7... In some cases I met terrorists. They were seen as people who helped the cause of the United States.<sup>28</sup>

The Brennecke testimony hit both Italy and the government of George Bush Senior in the US like a bomb. The CIA immediately denied the claim as 'absolute nonsense', while the Bush administration focused on Kuwait, which in the following month (August 1990) was invaded by Saddam Hussein, and thereafter attracted much media attention.<sup>29</sup> Licio Gelli sued Italian state television for £5 million in damages, and Italian Prime Minister Andreotti strongly denied that the CIA had ever backed terrorism in Italy, making a stinging attack on state television for broadcasting the reports. 'It is totally nonsensical to imagine that the US Congress could have authorised or even tacitly supported an operation of destabilisation

conducted against a friendly and allied country like Italy', Andreotti claimed in front of an excited Italian parliament.<sup>30</sup>

Italian President Francesco Cossiga ordered that the Brennecke television tapes be brought to him at the Quirinal Palace at once, and on 3 July 1990 he wrote to Prime Minister Andreotti, 'If these allegations are true, then a full legal investigation must follow', adding, 'If the allegations are untrue and this is "creative journalism", then the situation is no less serious and the courts must intervene.'<sup>31</sup> According to Licio Gelli's mistress, Nara Lazerini, Giulio Andreotti had himself been a member of the P2 and allegedly one of great influence. 'Gelli told me that Andreotti was also a member of his Lodge... I remember that within the P2 there was the rumour that Andreotti and not Gelli was the real boss.'<sup>32</sup>

As rumours and speculations as to the 'true nature' of the P2 and the involvement of the US spread in subsequent months and years, President Cossiga confirmed in 1993 that the P2 had been 'an American import', designed by US hard-liners in order to fight their worst fears 'concerning a potential alliance of DC-PSI-PCI', that is, the Italian communists into the government in coalition with the US-supported Democrazia Italiana (DC) and the Italian Socialist Party (PSI).<sup>33</sup> Cossiga said that it was obvious that American anti-communists were in charge of the P2 and that Gelli was their trusted man in Italy. 'There is no doubt that Gelli was not the real boss of the Lodge. Do you think military Generals of the highest ranks could have followed the orders of somebody like Gelli? He was a point of reference, who distributed key positions of power to those Generals who were friends of the US.'<sup>34</sup>

According to German journalist Regine Igel, it was Frank Gigliotti, a high-ranking US Freemason, who came to Italy in the 1950s and personally recruited Licio Gelli, giving him financial assistance and the task of building up an Italian network to fight communism.<sup>35</sup> Gigliotti was a powerful man, as Gelli knew, who had served in Italy as a member of the American secret service OSS (the predecessor of the CIA) during the Second World War, and who later advised US President Truman in the field of security policy and secret politics.<sup>36</sup> After his meeting with Gigliotti, Gelli had allegedly chosen the P2, which had existed for more than a century, to function as the centre of this anti-communist battle. Gelli became the director of the P2 in 1961 and enlarged the Lodge in subsequent years.<sup>37</sup>

Allegedly, Gelli repeatedly flew to the US for further instructions. Among other things, Washington informed him that the CIA had cooperated closely with the Italian intelligence service, SIFAR, whose director, Giovanni De Lorenzo, had begun to compile secret files in 1956 on over 157,000 Italian personalities. The existence of the secret SIFAR files was discovered in 1962, leading to a national scandal and a Parliamentary Commission. The files, containing information on abnormal habits or extramarital sexual relationships, were a powerful weapon of coercion. General Aldo Beolchini, President of the Parliamentary Commission, stated that through the files De Lorenzo had held most of the political class in his hand and that they were intimidated by his threats.<sup>38</sup> The parliamentary investigation was stunned at the level of interference and intrusion.

The persons were spied upon with cameras making close up pictures from afar, secret systems with which their correspondence was controlled, recordings of

what they had said in their phone calls, documentation with pictures of their extramarital relationships or sexual habits.<sup>39</sup>

In front of the parliamentarians investigating the scandal, SIFAR director De Lorenzo was forced to admit that the US and NATO had ordered him to set up the files as part of the larger task of fighting the Italian communists, as NATO feared that the PCI might weaken the transatlantic defence alliance from within.<sup>40</sup> Thereafter De Lorenzo was forced to resign and ordered to destroy the secret files. Clandestinely, however, he handed a copy over to his successor, General Giovanni Allavena, who in 1967 was recruited by Licio Gelli into the new and secretive P2 Lodge. Allavena gave Gelli a complete copy of the 157,000 'pressure files', thus adding greatly to the political influence of the P2 shadow government.

According to the anti-terror office of the Italian intelligence service SISMI, P2 grew steadily, as Gelli was given orders by representatives of the administration of US President Richard Nixon. In 1969, Gelli met with US General Alexander Haig, who had just returned from the war in Vietnam and from 1974 to 1979 served as the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO in Europe. Haig ordered Gelli to include selected NATO officers as members of the secretive P2. The SISMI report of 16 April 1983 read:

[i]t was Ted Shackley, director of all covert actions of the CIA in Italy in the 1970s, who presented the chief of the Masonic Lodge [Licio Gelli] to Alexander Haig. Haig and Kissinger authorised Gelli in the fall of 1969 to recruit 400 high ranking Italian and NATO officers into his Lodge.<sup>41</sup>

More than a quarter of a century after the discovery of the P2 it is still not possible to write a conclusive history of this Italian shadow government, its ideology, its strategy, the operations it carried out and the exact links it cultivated with the White House in Washington. Much more research is needed. A provisional conclusion on shadow governments must be that the historical data on the P2 proves that shadow governments do exist at times, that they operate beyond checks and balances and can lead to destruction of the democratic process. 'The damage that the P2 had caused to Italy has been compared to a wooden wardrobe attacked by an army of woodworms', Regine Igel commented. 'The wardrobe – the society – from the outside looks unchanged and stands on its four legs. While in reality the worms have eaten up everything and only a skeleton remains.'<sup>42</sup>

#### STAY-BEHIND

Licio Gelli, the Venerable Master of the P2, confirmed in the early 1990s that a secret anti-communist army, run by the Italian military secret service SIFAR and supplied by the CIA, had existed in Italy during the Cold War under the code-name 'Gladio' ('the sword'). In case of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, the secret Gladio soldiers were trained to operate as a guerrilla force behind enemy lines. In the absence of an invasion, their task was to fight the communists through clandestine warfare. 'The aim of Gladio and other similar organisations which existed in all

countries of Western Europe was to counter the invasion of the Red Army or the coming to power by coup d'état of the communist parties', Gelli explained. 'That the PCI, during all those years, has never come to power, although they have tried to do so repeatedly, is [to] the merit of the Gladio organisation.'<sup>43</sup>

In 1992, Gelli explained to the British newspaper the *Observer* that many Gladiators had been recruited on the political right. 'Many came from the ranks of mercenaries who had fought in the Spanish Civil War and many came from the fascist republic of Salo', Gelli said.

They chose individuals who were proven anti-communists. I know it was a well constructed organisation. Had communist strength grown in Italy, America would have assisted us, we would have unleashed another war and we would have been generously supplied with arms from the air.<sup>44</sup>

William Colby, Director of the CIA from 1973 to 1976, emphasised that this was 'a major program' of the CIA, designed to have top secret armed soldiers in Western Europe 'ready to be called into action as sabotage and espionage forces when the time came'.<sup>45</sup> And British intelligence scholar Nigel West confirmed that the Americans had carried out the operation in very close cooperation with British experts. 'We were heavily involved and still are... in these networks... The people who inspired it were the British and American intelligence agencies.'<sup>46</sup> According to Gelli, the US paid the bill. 'The Americans pay them [the Gladiators] large sums of money, the equivalent of an excellent salary. And they guaranteed the financial support of the families in case the Gladiator was killed.'<sup>47</sup>

Clandestine, anti-communist stay-behind armies existed in the NATO countries Germany, France, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway, as well as in countries that were officially neutral, including Sweden, Switzerland, Finland and Austria. For many years the CIA and the MI6 closely cooperated with European military and civilian intelligence services including, among others, SIFAR (Italy), UNA (Switzerland), MIT (Turkey), SGR (Belgium), BVD (Netherlands), BND (Germany), DGSE (France), NIS (Norway), KYP (Greece) and PIDE (Portugal).<sup>48</sup>

Within the CIA, the Covert Action Department Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) under Frank Wisner was responsible for setting up the stay-behind network after the Second World War, as William Colby recalled in his memoirs.

Thus, the OPC had undertaken a major program of building, throughout those Western European countries that seemed likely targets for Soviet attack, what in the parlance of the intelligence trade were known as 'stay-behind nets', clandestine infrastructures of leaders and equipment trained and ready to be called into action as sabotage and espionage forces when the time came.<sup>49</sup>

According to Italian sources familiar with Gladio, the CIA also used the secret soldiers – in the total absence of a Soviet invasion – to influence European politics through covert action operations. General Gerardo Serravalle, commander of the Italian stay-behind within the Italian military intelligence service from 1971 to 1974,

recalled how one day the CIA, which had long supplied secret soldiers across Western Europe with cash, guns and explosives, had stopped sending money and weapons for his Gladio unit. Serravalle was angry and called for a meeting with the chief of the CIA station in Italy, Howard Stone, whereupon Stone agreed to meet the Italian commander at the clandestine Gladio training centre, Saboteur's Training Camp (Centro Adestramento Guastatori, CAG) in Sardinia, on 15 December 1972.

Stone had come over because I asked him to. When I took over command, I noticed that the American financing, agreed in bilateral accords and in particular the shipping of material and armaments to us, had stopped. I did not understand why and they wouldn't give me an explanation. So I called this meeting in order to find out why they had stopped sending us the supplies,

Serravalle recalled,

So, after months of manoeuvring on both diplomatic and military fronts, I could finally invite Mr Stone and Mr [Mike] Sednaoui to the base in Sardinia. I said to them: 'This is our training centre etc., you could help us achieve our full potential. So why cut your aid? If this is your government's position, we accept it. But you owe us an explanation.'<sup>50</sup>

Serravalle reveals he only then started to understand that the CIA wanted to use the clandestine forces against domestic political enemies, that is, the Italian Communist Party, and not the Red Army.

I realised that the CIA interests, as represented by these officials, weren't really concerned with the level we had reached in training but rather with the subject of internal control. That is, our level of readiness to counter street disturbances, handling nation-wide strikes and above all any eventual rise of the Communist Party.<sup>51</sup>

Serravalle got a very clear impression of what the CIA and the US government wanted. 'Mr Stone stated, quite clearly, that the financial support of the CIA was wholly dependent on our willingness to put into action, to programme and plan these other – shall we call them – internal measures.'<sup>52</sup> Greatly disturbed members of the Italian parliament investigated the secret CIA army in the 1990s and came to the sensitive conclusion that members of the CIA network had linked up with Italian right-wing extremists in covert action operations and had supported them in a top secret campaign, which included terrorist attacks against civilians – attacks that were wrongly blamed on the Italian communists in order to discredit them at the polls. When Stanfield Turner, CIA Director from 1977 to 1981, was questioned on this dark side of the stay-behind operation in an interview in December 1990, he angrily ripped off his microphone and shouted, 'I said, no questions about Gladio!'<sup>53</sup>

Members of the Italian intelligence community have now gone on the record with claims that CIA covert action in Europe included the sponsoring of terrorism. In March 2001, General Gianadelio Maletti, the former head of Italian counter-



intelligence, had to testify on the Piazza Fontana case. Shortly before Christmas 1969, four bombs had exploded in public places in Rome and Milan, killing 16 and maiming or wounding 80, most of them in the Piazza Fontana in Milan. After the massacre, the Italian intelligence service planted bomb parts in the villa of well-known leftist editor Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, in order to blame the terror on the communists and the extreme left.

‘The CIA, following the directives of its government, wanted to create an Italian nationalism capable of halting what it saw as a slide to the left, and, for this purpose, it may have made use of right-wing terrorism’, Maletti testified in the Piazza Fontana trial. ‘The impression was that the Americans would do anything to stop Italy from sliding to the left’, the 79-year-old General explained, and added: ‘Don’t forget that Nixon was in charge and Nixon was a strange man, a very intelligent politician, but a man of rather unorthodox initiatives.’<sup>54</sup>

The European network of clandestine stay-behind armies was coordinated by NATO, because in the event of an invasion of Western Europe it would have been NATO’s task to coordinate military manoeuvres and re-establish European independence. Within NATO, two clandestine committees – the so-called ‘Clandestine Planning Committee’ (CPC) and the ‘Allied Clandestine Committee’ (ACC), both linked to NATO’s SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) – met regularly on the level of officers from the various European military intelligence services in order to discuss questions relating to stay-behind and secret warfare. Both ACC and CPC operated beyond democratic checks and balances, as national parliamentarians were, as a rule, completely unaware of their existence.

A SHAPE directive, unavailable to academics until now, regulated the details of the stay-behind armies, as Gladio commander Serravalle explained. This directive

related to the training of Gladiators in Europe, how to activate them from the secret headquarters in case of complete occupation of the national territory and other technical questions as, to quote the most important one, the unification of the different communication systems between the stay-behind bases. The CPC was...a centre with primary mission to co-ordinate in time of war the national resistance units at a specific moment between the occupation and the counter-offensive.<sup>55</sup>

Both the CIA as well as US Special Forces took part in these meetings, according to Serravalle.

At the stay-behind meetings representatives of the CIA were always present. They had no voting right and were from the CIA headquarters of the capital in which the meeting took place... Or members of the US Forces Europe Command were present, also without voting right.<sup>56</sup>

Thomas Polgar, who had retired in 1981 after a 30-year-long career in the CIA, explained with an implicit reference to CPC and ACC that the stay-behind programmes were coordinated by ‘a sort of unconventional warfare planning group linked to NATO’. In these two clandestine planning groups, senior officers of the

CIA, MI6 and NATO regularly meet with senior officers of European intelligence services, at times represented by the director of the intelligence service, as 'each national service did it with varying degrees of intensity'. According to Polgar, the ACC and CPC representatives 'would meet every couple of months in different capitals', adding that 'in Italy in the 1970s some of the people went a little bit beyond the charter that NATO had put down'.<sup>57</sup>

When the stay-behind networks were discovered in 1990, the press observed that the 'story seems straight from the pages of a political thriller'<sup>58</sup> and argued that this large international covert action programme represented 'the best-kept, and most damaging, political-military secret since World War II'.<sup>59</sup> The European Parliament debated the legal, social and political implications of the discovery. In a special resolution passed on 22 November 1990 the Parliament made it clear that it condemned

the clandestine creation of manipulative and operational networks and [called] for a full investigation into the nature, structure, aims and all other aspects of these clandestine organisations or any splinter groups, their use for illegal interference in the internal political affairs of the countries concerned, the problem of terrorism in Europe and the possible collusion of the secret services of Member States or third countries.<sup>60</sup>

During the debate in the Parliament, Italian parliamentarian Falqui had insisted that

...this Europe will have no future if it is not founded on truth, on the full transparency of its institutions in regard to the dark plots against democracy that have turned upside down the history, even in recent times, of many European states. There will be no future, ladies and gentlemen, if we do not remove the idea of having lived in a kind of double state – one open and democratic, the other clandestine and reactionary.

French parliamentarian Dury shared these concerns and added, 'What worried us in this Gladio affair was that these networks were able to exist out of sight and beyond control of the democratic political authorities. That, I think, is the fundamental issue which remains.' And Greek parliamentarian Ephremidis concluded,

the democracy we are supposed to have been enjoying has been, and still is, nothing but a front... The fine details must be uncovered, and we ourselves must establish a special sub committee of inquiry to hold hearings and to blow the whole thing wide open so that all the necessary steps can be taken to rid our countries of such clandestine organisations.<sup>61</sup>

Due to the prominent role of both the Pentagon and NATO in the secret operation, the European Parliament in its resolution stressed that it '[p]rotests vigorously at the assumption by certain US military personnel at SHAPE and in NATO of the right to encourage the establishment in Europe of a clandestine intelligence and

operation network'. As the Parliament itself had no authority to investigate security affairs which remained within the sovereign domain of each EU member state, it urged that further investigations into the affair should be carried out in all countries concerned. Therefore its resolution requested

...all the Member States to take the necessary measures, if necessary by establishing parliamentary committees of inquiry, to draw up a complete list of organisations active in this field, and at the same time to monitor their links with the respective state intelligence services and their links, if any, with terrorist action groups and/or other illegal practices.<sup>62</sup>

Yet today, the data on the stay-behind networks, and particularly their numerous alleged links to crime and terrorism, still remain fragmentary, as most states have refrained from investigating the stay-behind structures in detail, and have refused to present public reports.

## CONCLUSION

Academics, one might as well admit, face great difficulties when it comes to the analysis and description of the secret side of international politics. Shadow governments, including those few like the P2 that are on the historical record, and their links to paramilitary secret armies like Gladio, are extremely difficult to pin down. Many questions remain, only fragments can be collected and ordered into a narrative of limited coherence, which can only offer glimpses into the abyss of deceit and manipulation. Noble as it might be, the aim to penetrate and illuminate the world of parallel structures and secret warfare still has a long way to go, as most universities do not even teach and research the secret side of international politics as a field of enquiry. Judged from that perspective, one of the most important factors with regard to future international conflicts might lie in the emergence of a global conviction that we must not only strive for honesty and truth, but above all try to solve conflicts through transparent and peaceful means. For, clearly, violent solutions stand a more than reasonable chance of being manipulated in one way or another by clandestine groups.

## NOTES

1. See below, on the stay-behind army Gladio in Italy. For an international overview, compare Daniele Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe* (London: Frank Cass, 2005). The book was translated into Italian and published by Fazi in Rome in August 2005 (*Gli eserciti segreti della Nato. Operazione Gladio e terrorismo in Europa occidentale*). Then in October 2005 the Turkish translation was published in Istanbul by Güncel Press (*NATO'nun gizli orduları. Gladio Operasyonları, Terörizm ve Avrupa Güvenlik İlkeleri*). In July 2006 Ciceron translated and published the book in Slovenia (*Natova Skrivna Vojska. Operacija Gladio in terorizem v zahodni Evropi*). Greek and Estonian translations were published in 2007 by Antilogos Publishing and Tammerraamat, respectively.
2. Kathryn Olmsted, *Challenging the Secret Government: The Post-Watergate Investigations of the CIA and FBI* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), p. 9.

3. Official CIA homepage, [https://www.cia.gov/cia/public\\_affairs/faq.html#7](https://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/faq.html#7) (accessed 1 January 2007).
4. Christopher Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), p. 171.
5. Arthur Darling, *The Central Intelligence Agency: An Instrument of Government to 1950* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990), p. 245.
6. United States Senate, *Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities*, Book IV, 'Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Foreign and Military Intelligence' (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 36.
7. William Corson, *The Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire* (New York: Dial Press, 1977), p. 299. As the operation was secret the money was dirty and had to be laundered first. Corson explains that this was done by first withdrawing \$10 million in cash from the Economic Stabilization Fund, laundering it through individual bank accounts and from there 'donating' it to a variety of CIA front organisations.
8. Corson, *The Armies of Ignorance*, p. 298.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 298.
10. National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects, 18 June 1948 (NSC 10/2). Formerly Top Secret. Contained in full in Thomas Etzold and John Gaddis (eds), *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy 1945–1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), p. 125.
11. Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only*, p. 198.
12. Quoted in Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only*, p. 171. Allen Dulles, Director of CIA from 1953 to 1961, privately reminded Truman that he had always authorised CIA covert action. To the CIA legal counsel, Dulles wrote on the subject that '[a]t no time did Mr. Truman express other than complete agreement with the viewpoint I expressed'. *Ibid.*
13. Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only*, p. 198.
14. Quoted in Regine Igel, *Andreotti: Politik zwischen Geheimdienst und Mafia* (München: Herbig Verlag, 1997), p. 233.
15. Quoted in Igel, *Andreotti*, p. 233, and the Italian newspaper *Corriere della Sera*, 17 January 1994.
16. *Observer*, 21 February 1988.
17. No author specified, 'Aufatmen in Rom nach der Aufstürzung Gellis. Ein Leben wie aus einer vergangenen Zeit', in the Swiss daily *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 12 September 1998.
18. Paul Ginsborg, *A History of Contemporary Italy: Society and Politics 1943–1988* (London: Penguin Books, 1990), p. 423.
19. Philip Willan, *Puppetmasters: The Political Use of Terrorism in Italy* (London: Constable, 1991), p. 60.
20. British daily television news programme *Newsnight* on BBC1 on 4 April 1991.
21. Percentage of the national vote of the Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI) during the second half of the Cold War: 1968: 26.9%; 1972: 27.1%; 1976: 34.4%; 1979: 30.4%; 1983: 29.9%; 1987: 26.6%. After the end of the Cold War, the PCI changed its name to Partito Democratico della Sinistra (PDS), which got 16.1% at the 1992 polls. Source: Ginsborg, *A History of Contemporary Italy*, p. 442.
22. Senato della Repubblica Italiana, *Relazione della Commissione Parlamentare d'Inchiesta Sulla Loggia P2*. Roma 1984.
23. Sergio Flamigni, *Trame Atlantiche: Storia della Loggia massonica segreta P2* (Milano: Kaos edizioni, 2005), p. 261.
24. Igel, *Andreotti*, p. 229.
25. In an interview with Willan. Quoted in Willan, *Puppetmasters*, p. 55.
26. Quoted in *New Statesman*, 21 September 1984.
27. *Ibid.*
28. *Le Monde Diplomatique*, December 1990; *Reuters*, 1 August 1990; *Der Standard*, 24 July 1990. RAI broadcasted four interviews with Dick Brennecke between 28 June and 2 July 1990.
29. *Reuters*, 1 August 1990.
30. *Reuters*, 2 August 1990.

31. A copy of Cossiga's letter to Andreotti was leaked to the press, as so often happens in Italy. The Italian political magazine *Panorama* published it and the Presidential Palace confirmed that it was genuine. Quoted in *The Times*, 24 July 1990.
32. Igel, *Andreotti*, p. 243.
33. Quoted in Igel, *Andreotti*, p. 231.
34. Quoted in Flamigni, *Trame Atlantiche*, p. 261.
35. Igel, *Andreotti*, p. 231.
36. Frank Gigliotti was powerful enough to advise President Harry Truman, allegedly a fellow Freemason, to fire CIA Director General Bedell Smith. In his letter to Truman, dated 30 September 1952, Gigliotti wrote: 'My dear President Truman' and then in a commanding tone noted:

Some months ago while talking with Margaret Vaughn at their home I told her that I felt that General Bedell Smith would let you down the first opportunity that he had... I want you to know, my dear President, that we have loved you and respected you and defended your flank in season and out of season, through the churches, through political organisations, and before the general public... [but] The statement of General Bedell Smith last night that 'There is no security organisation in the government of the United States into which communists have not infiltrated themselves' is a shame upon him... What has he been doing all this time besides nursing his ulcers...? You will remember that a little over a year ago I made the statement that what we needed to head Central Intelligence was a man who gave ulcers to the enemy and not one who allowed the enemy to produce ulcers in his own system and in the thinking of the Nation. I feel that...now as Chief of CIA he [Smith] has been a perfect dud... I think, along with many others of your friends, that the Intelligence of the United States as centralised in Bedell Smith is at the lowest ebb it has ever been in the history of the United States... I am sending you this information as your friend, and I am asking these question not only as your friend, but as one who has consecrated and dedicated his life to helping make our beloved America a place where future generations will be proud of the fact that you were President of the United States... Mr. Smith should be brought to task... I feel that he has betrayed all of the confidence that you have placed in him. With regards and prayers, I remain Your friend Frank B. Gigliotti.

(Document found by the author. Papers of Harry S. Truman, Harry S. Truman Library, White House Central Files, Confidential Files.) The letterhead gives Frank Gigliotti's address as: 3777 Gigliotti Drive, Lemon Grove, California.

On 20 January 1953, Eisenhower as new President entered the White House and replaced Truman. On 9 February 1953, Bedell Smith was fired and Allen Dulles replaced him as Director of Central Intelligence.

37. Flamigni, *Trame Atlantiche*, p. 36.
38. Aldo Beolchini to *La Repubblica* on 21 December. Also in Igel, *Andreotti*, p. 51.
39. *Relazione della Commissione parlamentare d'inchiesta sugli eventi del giugno-luglio 1964*, Roma 1971, p. 67. Quoted in Igel, *Andreotti*, p. 51.
40. *Commissione parlamentare d'inchiesta sugli eventi del giugno-luglio 1964, Relazione di minoranza*, Roma 1971, p. 307. Compare Igel, *Andreotti*, p. 53.
41. Quoted in Igel, *Andreotti*, p. 232; *Observer*, 18 November 1990; French weekly *Le Monde Diplomatique*, December 1990. Both Gelli and Haig were furious about this SISMI report and the promising career of Emilio Santillos, director of the SISMI anti-terror office, ended abruptly soon after the report of April 1983. Also the biographies of his fellow investigators took a tragic twist. SISMI Colonel Florio died in a mysterious car accident. SISMI Colonel Serrentonio left the service 'for reasons of ill health'. Major Rossi committed suicide. Major Antonio de Salvo surprisingly left the anti-terror office in good health and joined the Freemasons; Compare: Igel, *Andreotti*, p. 234.
42. Igel, *Andreotti*, p. 239.
43. Jean-Francois Brozzu-Gentile, *L'affaire Gladio* (Paris: Editions Albin Michel, 1994), p. 28.
44. 'They were the agents who were to "stay behind" if the Red Army overran Western Europe. But the network that was set up with the best intentions degenerated in some countries into a front

- for terrorism and far-right political agitation.' Hugh O'Shaughnessy, 'Gladio: Europe's Best Kept Secret', *Observer*, 7 June 1992.
45. William Colby, *Honourable Men: My Life in the CIA* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), p. 81.
  46. International news service *Associated Press*, 14 November 1990.
  47. Brozzu-Gentile, *L'affaire Gladio*, p. 28.
  48. For an international overview, compare: Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies*.
  49. Colby, *Honourable Men*, pp. 81 and 82.
  50. General Serravalle's testimony in front of documentary film-maker Allan Francovich's camera. Serravalle speaks Italian; the English translation is by the film company (subtitles). See Allan Francovich, *Gladio: The Puppeteers*, second of three Francovich Gladio documentaries, broadcast on BBC2 on 17 June 1992.
  51. Serravalle, in Francovich, *Gladio*.
  52. *Ibid.*
  53. *Independent*, 1 December 1990.
  54. Philip Willan, 'Terrorists "Helped by CIA" to Stop Rise of Left in Italy', *Guardian*, 26 March 2001.
  55. Gerardo Serravalle, *Gladio* (Roma: Edizioni Associate, 1991), p. 78.
  56. *Ibid.*, p. 79.
  57. Jonathan Kwitny, 'The CIA's Secret Armies in Europe', *The Nation*, 6 April 1992, p. 445.
  58. *The Times*, 19 November 1990.
  59. *Observer*, 18 November 1990.
  60. Resolution of the European Parliament on the Gladio Affair, 22 November 1990.
  61. Debates of the European Parliament, 22 November 1990. Official transcripts.
  62. Resolution of the European Parliament on the Gladio Affair, 22 November 1990.